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Abstract 
Ryan' s ( 1994 )framework for understanding the essential componenls ofworkplace reform ties management notions of 
quality and continuous improvement- key 'drivers' in New Zealand business today- to union concerns about shared 
decision-making and joint responsibility between management and labour. The purpose of the present paper is to use 
a 'grounded theory' approach to further develop and illustrate that framework, drawing on a recent case study of 
workplace reform at BHP New Zealand Steel's Glenbrook plant between 1990 and 1994. Case study data on the 
company's Business Improvement Programme (BIP) shows what 'joint responsibility' actually means in terms of the 
development of business strategy and work practices built round quality on a day-to-day basis. 
Against a backdrop of tmbulence created by the legacy of 
the 'Think Big' projec~ deregulation and frequent owner-
ship changes, BHP New Zealand Steel commenced a 
three-year 'Business Improvement Programme' (BIP) in 
1991 at its Glenbrook plant south-west of Auckland. 
Operations at the steel plant were divided into 30 business 
units. In a succession of 'waves', clusters of units under-
went a 12-week in-depth analysis of existing operations, 
identifying cost-savings and value-added ideas and devel-
oping an implementation plan. 
The company made some progress in improving produc-
tivity, product quality and customer service. Case study 
findings show, however, that significant progress could 
only be made when joint management/labour agnxments 
and processes were developed that facilitated genuine 
participation, infonnation-sharing and other improvements 
in the quality. of working life. 
This paper briefly outlines the workplace reform context, 
describes the BIP process with examples from the Supply 
and Inventory Unit and the Coil Coating Line, and exam-
ines worker and union experience of the reform initiatives. 
In particular, the paper examines joint management/union 
agreements and processes that were developed as the 
company gained experience with the BIP process and saw 
its limitations. Indicators of the success of the refonn 
initiatives for New Zealand Steel's viability are also sum-
marised. Case study data are then used to develop and 
illustrate a model that shows how workplace change can be 
effected to mutual advantage when managemen~ unions 
and workers take joint responsibility for the operation of 
the enterprise. 
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Context of work place reform 
BHP New Zealand Steel is a fully integrated steel plant 
employing 1853 full-time employees and 238 casual em-
ployees and contractors. Substantial increases were made 
to plant capacity during the 'Think Big' era. By 1989 there 
had been significant overruns in capital expenditure and 
the plant was not performing to capacity. Added to these 
problems, import protection and export incentives had 
been withdrawn. BHP New Zealand Steel faced a major 
problem with high debt servicing costs, declining domes-
tic demand, increased competition from imported steel and 
considerable ownership uncertainty arising first from its 
privatisation and then from the collapse of its new owners. 
When BHP took control over the plant in 1989, as part of 
an invesbnent consortium, the company set three perform-
ance goals: a 50 per cent increase in production without 
adding to capacity; reducing unit costs by 40 per cent; and 
doubling productivity. BHP New Zealand Steel devel-
oped the longer-tenn strategic BIP Programme to achieve 
these goals by eliminating defects, reducing cycle times, 
achieving a 40 per cent reduction in 'compressible costs' 
and identifying cost savings of $50 million. These initia-
tives were underpinned both by a 'Total Quality Manage-
ment' (TQM)~roachanda 'FourQuadrantLeadership' 
(4QL) strategy aimed at empowering people to make 
decisions to increase their job efficiency. 
BIP programme 
A small project group, reporting to the managing director, 
was set up to develop a cost-reduction continuous im-
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provement strategy. The group began by talking to their 
Australian counterparts, American and New Zealand con-
sultants and other New Zealand companies. A number of 
consultants made fonnal submissions and presentations to 
the senior management group. As this process unfolded, 
the project group concluded that the change process should 
be handled internally to provide 'better buy-in and owner-
ship' on site. Their proposal was based on 'creating a 
uniquely NZ Steel approach' and adapted approaches 
proposed by outside consultants and involved greater 
emphasis on lQM and 4QL Leadership (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Four quadrant leadership 
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The 4QL Leadership model empowers people to make 
decisions depending on their 'job efficiency' level (a 
mixture of knowledge, skiJJs and motivation). The model 
spells out four increasing levels of participation in decision 
making based on the extent to which the leader can have 
confidence in the job efficiency of the employee or col-
league and should therefore delegate the task. For exam-
ple, a Q4 level means that the leader has complete confi-
dence in the colleague and can delegate decision making 
on the basis of the instruction 'You decide, but contact me 
if you wish'. In a Q3 decision, the leader has ag~eed that 
' the parties will discuss and the parties will decide' . Q2 is 
used when the leader agrees to respect and consider col-
leagues' views and opinions before making a decision. 
The leader's message is 'we'll discuss and I'll decide'.' Q 1 
implies the leader's message, 'I'll decide' . 
Following further research, the project group - later re-
named the business improvement programme (BIP) team 
-recommended that two separate approaches be adopted to 
search for cost savings. The first approach was based on 
the method developed by international business consult-
ants, McKinsey and Company, known as 'Delta P', which 
had been successfully employed in the French steel indus-
try and by BHP in its Australian steel operations. The Delta 
p method is essentially concerned with identifying cost 
savings. It provides a way of distinguishing total produc-
tion costs between those which are 'compressible' , that is 
reducible within current production capacity, and those 
which are fixed or 'non-compressible'. From the applica-
tion of this method, a 40 per cent reduction in compressible 
costs was aimed for. 
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The second approach involved the use of process mapping. 
This technique was made popular by its use in the Ameri-
can company, Motorola, where it had been used to elimi-
nate defects and reduce cycle times. The success achieved 
by Motorola was reviewed and this convinced the BIP 
team that considerable savings could be found by using the 
mapping methodology to identify inefficiencies and im-
prove the integration of different business units on the 
Glenbrook site. 
The BHP New Zealand Steel operation was divided into 30 
business units which were assigned a business improve-
ment leader from the BIP Team. These units were selected 
for in-depth analysis from which line managers would 
identify and implement improvements. Each unit had a 
leader to work full-time in developing and applying the 
process. The analysis took place in five phases (Figure 2) 
within 12-week waves covering four to eight units. A pilot 
wave of three units began in Aprill992 and was followed 
by eleven further waves which concluded in April1994. 
BIP unit teams were instructed in the use of two method-
ologies: an organisational unit method, and a cross func-
tional process mapping method. 
The unit method was typically used for discrete organisa-
tional areas or business units, such as the Coil Coating Line 
or the Steel Plant Mechanical Maintenance. Over the 12-
week wave, the organisational unit underwent five succes-
sive phases: it assembled a data base on the existing 
operations, identified and evaluated proposed improve-
ment activities, made recommendations and sought ap-
proval from the steering committee, developed an imple-
mentation and measurement plan, communicated the out-
comes and in week 13, began a phase of implementation, 
monitoring and review. During the 12-week BIP process, 
the base costs and key performance measures were estab-
lished, projected savings targets defined, ideas to meet or 
exceed this target generated and, after approval for the 
recommendations was reached and communicated widely, 
the implementation plan and performance indicators were 
developed. 
Cross-functional process mapping is used to analyse work 
processes that span several work areas or functions, such 
as the cycle involved in receipt of an order for a particular 
product to its delivery to the customer. Cross functional 
process mapping involved a' diagonal slice' of the relevant 
workforce across all relevant functions as well as across 
key internal customers and suppliers. The process was 
carried out in two formal mapping sessions, usually held 
about a month apart, and taking one to three days each 
session depending on the size of the process. The first 
session created an 'as is ' map, setting out the start and end 
points and each step in the process, determining times 
associated with each step and identifying any issues. The 
second session developed a 'should be' map, reviewing 
the first map and times, and brainstorming possible solu-
tions to the issues raised in the fiTSt session. After the 
mapping sessions, the cross functional process followed 
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Figure 2. Overview of the BHP New Zealand business improvement process 
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the same stages as the organisational unit method. 
Cross-fimctional mapping can be illustrated through the 
experience of the Supply and Inventory Unit The unit 
comprises 55 people in the following departments: stores, 
purchasing, accounts payable, raw materials, finance and 
planning. A team of 35 was brought together for six days 
of 'as is' and 'should be' process mapping. As BIP Leader, 
Robert Cram, explained, the team comprised senior man-
agement (including the managing director), site delegates, 
cbargehands and people from the shopfloor and repre-
sented 'every division, every discipline, every geographic 
location' involved with the supply and inventory process. 
Cram said this meant that 'you had representation of all 
functions and authority, and therefore you were able to 
make decisions then and there'. 
The unit had a cycle time range (defined as 'when a need 
is identified through to when the goods or services are 
accepted and paid for') of between 28 to 75 days. A new 
target cycle time of 17 days was identified dming the 
process mapping phases based on identifying the non-
value adding activities and how to remove them. Twelve 
improvement groups were set up to achieve this reduction 
in cycle time. A key strategy involved setting up a limited 
number of contract partnerships with 200 suppliers, and 
operating a 'stockless inventory' which reduced ex re-
moved former purchasing functions. By June 1994, cycle 
time had been reduced to three to four days on a rolling 
average. 
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Social Policy 
Alongside the search for cost savings, the business im-
provement programme introduced a 'social policy' . That 
policy was designed to reduce the fear of change and 
encourage maximum employee participation in the im-
provement process. The policy was developed by a team of 
nine representatives from management, union, workers 
and supervisory or salaried staff. It provided two opportu-
nities for everyone on the Glen brook site to make written 
submissions to a draft plan. More than 100 at each oppor-
l\mity were received by the team, 30 per cent of them 
groups, indicating the high level of discussion encouraged 
by the social policy proposal. The policy noted that while 
jobs would change, and many would disappear entirely, no 
layoffs would be enforced solely as a result of the BIP 
initiative. Employment would be safeguarded through 
redeployment and training and various other employment 
safeguards including: 
1. maintenance of earnings for six months; 
2. a guarantee of an alternative job, with provision for 
refusal if it was not seen as appropriate; 
3. defined criteria for selection of surplus employees in a 
particular operational area: 
4. a temporary labour register of surplus employees was 
maintained confidentially by personnel staff and these 
people were given priority for any vacancies; 
5. if at the end of six months suitable alternative employ-
ment had not been found, the person could apply for 
voluntary release, including a 'lump sum' payment; 
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6. the establishment of an independent appeals board 
The provisions of the social policy were effective from 
April .1?92. ThepolicywasreviewedinFebruary 1993and 
a deciSlon confinned that the policy would end in May 
1995. By June 1994, out of 107 people who were shifted 
between jobs as a result of the BIP process, only three used 
the appeal procedure to review their job reallocation. 
Consultation and participation structure 
A final component of the BIP was the establishment of a 
new consultation and participation structure. Unit Com-
munications Groups (UCGs) were set up to facilitate 
consultation and participation in the improvement proc-
ess. UCGs consist of representatives from management. 
elected representatives from all parts of the unit, and the 
local union area representative. They met weekly during 
the formation of the BIP plan and, less regularly, to 
monitor its implementation. Ideas for cost savings, adding 
value and customer service improvements were generated 
in brainstorming sessions with the entire work group in the 
unit. UCGs evaluated the ideas put forward and proposed 
changes for management approval The communications 
group was responsible for keeping the workforce of the 
unit informed of progress and providing feedback on any 
issues at all stages of the process (Elsley and Graham, 
1993). Formation of the UCGs led to increased employee 
involvement in key steps of the process, especially in the 
evaluation of ideas that had been generated from the 
shopfloor and in implementation planning. 
Working through change - a mixed response 
The previous section has outlined the B lP process as it was 
finally assembled. Its various components were modified 
as experience was gained, particularly with respect to the 
consultation procedures. The UCGs were extended after 
the BIP team and senior managers reviewed the success of 
the BIPprocess in the first two business units affected. BIP 
leader, Peter Jenkins, believed that while employee in-
volvement in the BIP process initiatives was considerable 
- in keeping with past practice on the site - it was also 
acknowledged that employee involvement was not as 
effective as hoped in the first two business units 'partly 
because we were all learning, and partly because there 
were different expectations'. 
Site delegates confirmed that there was resistance to the 
BIP process because workers were initially involved in 
ideas generation, but not the stages of ideas evaluation and 
decision making about subsequent implementation. As a 
site delegate explained, 'we did bring about some change 
and managed to get employees involved in evaluation, but 
only after management had done the initial sifting of the 
ideas'. Union concerns were then taken up during negotia-
tions over the 1992 Collective Employment Contract 
(CEC), discussed in the following section. The communi-
cation elements of BIP were then completely reviewed by 
the BIP team and members of the CEC negotiations group. 
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Site delegates from the Electrical Workers' and Engi-
neers' Union provided the following perspective on the 
BIP process that illustrates the range of key issues and 
a~~des that need to be addressed when implementing 
s1gnificant workplace refonn initiatives. They explained 
that uni?"s did not become involved in the BIP process, 
except m a reactive way, until the CEC Contract of 
December 1992. The delegates said that there was a lot of 
debate among members about whether unions should be 
part of the process at all and, as one of them put i~ 'we had 
to persuade members that these things were going to 
happen anyway' and that the business had to stay viable. 
Negotiations over the issue of consultation and participa-
tion (Clause 5 of the CEC Contract) took place because 
'management had seen that they wouldn' t get very far 
without our involvement'. One delegate explained that 
What had happened was that management would come 
to the end of aBIP and say 'yes, that is going to happen' , 
but then they couldn't make it happen without our 
involvement. [Then he added] Why should we have to 
put in [the contract] 'you will behave in a consultative 
way'. Why shouldn't they do it naturally? 
We've found that we're going to have teach managers 
who've spent 20 years managing in an environment in 
which people are simply told - we' re having to teach 
them the skills to consult, where they are genuinely 
seeking advice - teaching the skills to do it and the 
attitude. 
In reflecting on what he had come to understand 'con-
sultation ' actuaJJy meant, the other delegate commented: 
What I've learned is if you go into a discussion with a 
pre-determined idea of what the outcome is likely to 
be, you don' t get genuine consultation. [However] If 
you go in with a situation where you say "here's the 
issue and let's work through it" then you do. 
It only takes the other side to fall into that situation,puJ 
the [pre-determined] agenda on the table, then you 
don't get anywhere. 
The critical thing is to seek advice then make the 
decision. We've still got heaps of people on both sides 
who make the decision in advance , then they consult. 
We've got a lot of history here that makes that ap-
proach hard. 
CEC negotiations led to a review of BIP communications. 
The review was done in January 1993 and modifications 
incorporated in BIP. The CEC (with its consultation and 
participation provisions) was ratified in December 1992 
and ran to September 1994. The CEC covers shop-floor 
production and support staff such as trades, clerical and 
stores. Previously consultation had only been guaranteed 
in the Engineers ' Union CEC and this only specified co-
operation, not participation as in the new agreement The 
agreement was intended to cover restructuring such as that 
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occurring atGlenbrook under the BIPprogramme. It made 
provisions to: 
1. establish an effective consultation and participation 
structure, 
2. recognise that employee security and welfare required a 
joint co-operative approach between the company and 
the unions, and 
3. recognise that the smooth introduction of new produc-
tion improvements, wc..t methods, processes, equip-
ment, technology and training could only be achieved by 
consultation and participation. 
The agreement commits BHP New Zealand Steel manage-
ment and site unions to reach consensus on any of these 
itemised changes in order to: 
l.ensme that workers can contribute information and input 
into decision making, 
2. make full use of workers' experience and ideas on the 
efficient running of BHP New Zealand Steel, 
3. give management and unions the opportunity to under-
stand each others' views and objectives, and 
4. Jreserve the employment of individual workers and to 
avoid redundancies. 
Three main structures were proposed as the mechanism to 
achieve these various goals: (i) the BHP New ZeaJand 
Steel Consultation Group; (ii) local Consultation Commit-
tee activities; and (ill) business review meetings. 
1. A BHP New Zealand Steel Consultation Group would 
represent all workers covered by the CEC, and comprise 
a representative from each of the unions who were party 
to the contract, and an equal number of management 
representatives. This group has been formed and meets 
every two months and/oc as required to raise and resolve 
. 1ssues. 
2. Local consultation committees were to be established in 
business units or plants to consider matters relevant to 
that area of the company. Unit Communications Groups, 
discussed in the preceding section, were subsequently 
formed to achieve this objective. 
3. Information sharing with delegates was to be further 
developed into full-day quarterly business review meet-
ings to consider and discuss BHP New Zealand Steel's 
performance and company-wide matters of common 
concern to management and the unions. The company 
would provide relevant commercial, financial market-
ing and production information at the meeting. This has 
since occmred. 
The pursuit of greater employee involvement and partici-
pation in decision making put different pressures on man-
agement and workers. Some senior managers were seen by 
their peers and employees as 'having trouble letting go' of 
control, while middle managers were seen as 'being pulled 
in both directions. They're in the process of putting in 
place changes that will ultimately see their positions go'. 
Conversely, managers who were grappling with the prac-
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tical implications of providing employees with greater 
opportunity for involvement in workplace decision mak-
ing, noted that this was not always easy to achieve. As one 
manager expressed it, 'people on the shopfloor say they 
want the responsibility. When they suddenly get it, it really 
frightens them.' One implication of this is the need for 
managers at every level and shopfloor workers to have 
appropriate training and ski11s development to assist them 
in making the transition. 
The nature of the decision-making process was a cause of 
debate among delegates. One commented that manage-
ment had a tendency to begin discussions on an issue 
by stating 'we' 11 discuss this under Q3' [by operating on 
the basis of the leadership principle 'We'll discuss and 
we'll decide']. Then if we don't get agreement they'll 
shift to Q2 ['We'll discuss and I'll decide' ]. There's 
still the problem with management that they won' 1 
relinquish the power. Some will, but not across the 
board. 
The nature and extent of employee involvement and genu-
ine participation in decision-making varied from unit to 
unit (Elsley and Graham 1993). Common problems expe-
rienced by the UCGs included the fact that the success of 
the communications strategy was dependent on the origi-
nal relationship between the unit head and the workforce, 
and UCG members did not always understand their role. 
The worldorce was not able to influence the outcomes as 
much as some workers would like because of workers' 
lack of experience in the situation, a similar lack of 
experience by management, and the need for greater 
training to address these problems (Elsley and Graham, 
1993). Where these problems were overcome, as in the 
Coil Coating Unit Case Study described below, workforce 
relations have improved, leading as far as experimentation 
with self-managing work groups . 
A senior site delegate summed up the BIP programme in 
the following way, revealing how different attitudes cut 
across traditional ' them and us' thinking: 
Many workers at BHP Steel see the trust [from manag-
ers] is still not there. We've still got a long way to go.lt' s 
going to take a long time to tzun that round. Trust has to 
be given./ think that the union has given a lot. The reality 
is that there is still a lot of mistrust, but not just between 
workers and management, but among unions as well. 
BIP has disrupted a lot of cosy existences and a lot of 
positions have disappeared here. A lot of people who 
didn' t have to justify their existence now have to. People 
at all levels are a lot more accountable. lt was a cosy 
existence for a lot. There were cosy little numbers for 
people everywhere- on the shop floor right through [to 
management levels]. 
People had manipulated themselves into those situa-
tions because there was no overall strategy to ensure 
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that people would play their part. The BIP process has 
put everything wader the microscope. Everybody, right 
through all the levels. Every job had to be justified. 
Nothing has been missed. You can run but you can't 
hide. [He cited the example of] A person who used to do 
very linle. He did what he was required to do, but three 
quarters of the day he sat round doing crosswords. 
Union people objected to labour once again being 
treated as 'compressible costs'. Too often when labour 
costs are looked at it's only the shop floor. This time the 
BIP process looked at every position up to Area Man-
ager. It looked at all positions. 
While the improvement programme did not have a 'head-
count reduction' target, given the history of job losses in 
earlier phases of restructuring, in some workers' minds the 
cost saving target of $50 million was seen as a labour-
saving strategy, even with the social policy provisions. 
This view was greatest in those areas which lost jobs, such 
as the stores. In the 18 months prior to December 1993, the 
number of storespersoos had been reduced from 23 to 13. 
Three supervisors and four staff had taken voluntary 
retirement, while the remainder bad moved to other jobs on 
the site. An older storesperson commented: 
BIP is coming into all companies [in New Zealand]. /t is 
a numbers game./ don't say/like it,but it has to happen. 
It's put people under a lot of stress. You don't know 
where you stand. The way to work is to come and do your 
job to the best of your ability and hope you'll be there the 
next day. It's hard for young people with family . Who 
knows what the future holds. You just live in hope. 
That's the hardest thing to deal with. / want to retain my 
job. r d go nuts just sitting around at home. And [refer-
ring to his age] then the age comes into it. [He paused 
uncertainly, then adde<L as if to reassure himself] , they 
say if someone's BIPPED out of here, they' 11 find you 
another job within the company. They'll do their very 
best. They' re not just going to BIP you out of here and 
out the gate. 
Coil coating line case study 
The coil coating production process 
The coil coating line was commissioned in 1982, at a cost 
of $23 million. Coil coating is the process where paint is 
applied to galvanised or cold rolled steel continuously, 
producing a range of Colorsteel T products. The coils are 
uncoiled, degreased, chemically retreated, primer-coated 
on both sides, baked, cooled, painted. rebalced, cooled, 
inspected and then recoiled. All this is done at speeds 
ranging from 30 to 76 m/min (Naidu and Preece, 1993). 
The plant operates on fifteen shifts per wee~ with over-
time on weekends to supply peak demands. The base 
production capacity is about 45,000 tonnes per annum, 
although this varies with the mix of products made (Naidu 
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and Preece. 1993). 
The change process 
The coil coating line was one of the units in the third wave 
to go through the BIP process on the Glenbrook site. The 
unit manager worked fulltime on this process for tlnee 
months together with a BIP leader. A total of 570 ideas f<X' 
cost-savings were generated through involvement of all 
employees in the unit in brainstorming sessions. From this 
a total of 38 were selected for implementation. Out of a 
total cost structure of $46.1 million for the base period 
1991/92, $38.9 million were identified as 'non-compress-
ible' (ie. fixed) with an identified savings target of $3.8 
million. By July 1993, $4.03 million in cost savings in 
operational expenses, labour, raw materials, energy and 
water had been identified. 
One identified cost saving related to delays in gauge 
changes. The unit manager, Bob Naidu, explained that the 
saving came as a result of an idea by a person from the 
shopfloor who had said 'run by gauge not by width, a 
suggestion that didn't involve one cent of investment. The 
average delay in gauge changes had been running at 38 
hours per month. As a consequence of implementing the 
worker's idea, for the three month period from October to 
December, 1993, delays fell to an average of 25 hours per 
month. Sustaining these reductions would lead to savings 
of 12 hours per month, enabling additional production of 
1,200 tonnes of painted steel per year, valued at around $2 
million. 
Experience of the changes 
The manager, Bob Naidu, described his experience with 
the BIP programme in the following way: 
It was a good thing, an important catalyst that helped us 
start seeing what we could do with the numbers. BIP is 
a very structured process, and Rod McBride [the BIP 
leader working with him] had an accounting back-
ground. [However] We were looking at reducing 40 per 
cent of compressible costs. It was very stressful for 
everyone. 
Wedidn' t go in with a view of taking out people. We had 
an open mind. [However, he expressed concern that] 
from a human point of view how much would people 
want to give ideas when they were likely to result in a 
reduction in the number of jobs ... The workforce would 
give lots of ideas but not always appreciate that it would 
affect manning levels - even if not directly. 
A steering committee was formed three months into the 
unit' s BIP process as a pilot when the flrst two BIP waves 
were experiencing difficulties. The committee comprised 
elected members from each of the key areas of the plant, 
together with the unit manager and the site delegate. The 
manager said 
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There's a lot of experience in the group - a mixture of a 
lot of machine experience and outside business experi-
ence... This steering committee couldn't have existed 
before [under the previous climate, management proc-
esses and worldng relationships]. 
Decisions were made by the steering committee, then each 
member took responsibility for restructming a particular 
area of the plant using the apptopriate quadrant level of 
decision-making. The site delegate believed the trade-off 
was that the delegate and workers ' got to buy into' the 
decisions. Contrasting this with the situation prior to the 
development of the consultation and participation process, 
and the formation of the steering committee, the manager 
commented that 
We'd been trying consultlltionfor some time here. [They 
- the site delegate and workers] always brought up the 
kitchen sink issues. Then BlP came in. lt made me think 
as well [about union views on the different issues] 
The site delegate, Alan Preece, admitted candidly that 
given the adversarial nature of the workplace 
When 1 started here seven years ago they got the del-
egate they wanted. 1 was very good at being belliger-
ent ... solmanagedtoforceBob [the manager] into being 
a general asshole. 
The union and management in Coil Coating had been 
ttying to develop a process of consultation since 1989, but 
it bad not worked because of the antagonism between him 
and the manager. In the end we said 'we'lljustcall it quits 
and just go back to ' them and us', then the business 
improvement programme was introduced. 
Along the way we got a bit of respect for each other and 
we discovered that we 1uuJ a number of things in com-
mon. / started not calling Bob 'a shit' in front of union 
meetings. / believe the guys were sick of playing games. 
The BlP process was a catalyst for this. 
A member ofthe steering committee, Steve Wotton, who 
works as a coater, said that be hoped they would not come 
to the end of the BIP implementation process 'and just 
decide to stop'. He voiced the feeling of other members in 
the group that the Steering Committee should be the 
vehicle for continuous improvement indefinitely. 
A1an Preece also spoke for everyone when he described the 
Steering Committee as the plant management committee: 
We are not just here to manage the process, we' re into 
what business decisions are being made. Here we' re 
using Q3 Decisions. Before, Bob was using Q2 and 1 
said, basically, "you don' 1 trust me". 
Coater: We have a mutual respect for each other now. 
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Site delegate: Bob's really at the stage where he thinks 
it would be marvellous to be done out of a job. We get the 
same data as the manager. 
Coater: The track we' re going down is endless. Both 
management and workers are having to let go some of 
the traditional things we've had control over. [Ulti-
mately] You let go. 
Site delegate: We've let go the righlofa union to say 'no 
you' re not changing us' . We say now, we work on base 
numbers, if the business signal is you get rid of six people 
tomorrow then we have to look at it. 
Coater: In the past if the management said it you'd do the 
opposite. Now we' re starting to look at things through 
management's eyes and they' re looking at things through 
our eyes. We've cut out a lot of the bull. 
Workplace change through joint 
responsibility 
Total Quality Management systems depend on achieving 
a higher level of commitment and the contribution of 
workers' knowledge and skills through increased partici-
pation. They are also based on the principle that ' those who 
are involved in making the decision work, need to be 
involved in making the decision' (Young, 1992). New 
Zealand case study research indicates that levels of consul-
tation are certainly increasing as workplace refonn strate-
gies are implemented (Perry, Davidson and Hill, in press), 
and they create a basis for wider participation in the 
workplace as the example of BHP New Zealand Steel 
shows. 
However to assess the extent to which decision-making is 
changing the balance of power in the workplace, it is 
important to distinguish strategic decision-making and 
decision-making that relates to the organisation and con-
ditions of work on the 'shopfloor'. Moreover, the latter 
can take the fonn of ·managed participation', rather than 
genuine 'participative management· (Deutsch, 1989). Par-
ticipation in strategic decisions can give the workforce a 
material effect on the success of the business and its long-
term viability and, consequently, on the employment secu-
rity of those who work there. Similarly, genuine 
participative management in technology changes and job 
design captures the ideas and cornmmitment of workers to 
processes of continuous learning and improvement 
Table 1 provides a conceptual framewo~ based on the 
experience of BHP NZ Steel, that shows what participa-
tion and joint responsibility can mean for (i) the develop-
ment of business strategy. production processes and work 
practices built around 'quality '; (ii) structures and proc-
esses for participation in these three arenas of decision 
making; and (ill) business and employment outcomes for 
management and workers respectively. 
Table 1 also illustrates the range and nature of mechanisms 
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Table 1. Workplace change through joint responsibility: arenas, mechanisms and 
outcomes 
"-~-· ~c· ~JOD -ma ang arenas 
BusiMss StnJUgy 
• investment 
•marlcets 
• tectmologies 
• products 
• HR policies 
Production Processes 
• B:£1>3 programme 
• 'TQM processes 
• tectmology changes and job design 
• work -based continuing education 
Employment Conditions tuUl 
Practices 
MechBDisms for Participation 
and Accountability1 
•participation agnx:ment in CECZ 
(covering production changes and 
restructming) 
Outcomes for Management and 
Workers 
• captures ideas and commitment of 
workers in business development 
• quarterly business review (reps from • fosters long term viability of 
management and site committee) business and employment security 
• Coil Coating Line management 
committee (reps from management, 
work areas and delegates) 
• Hollow Sections survival plan 
• BIP methods teams, cross-functional 
process mapping teams, to redesign 
work systems (includes union del-
egate) 
• UCGTs4 (Unit consultation and 
partipation structme-includes 
delegate) 
• Team-based work systems that 
optimise commitment and learning 
(Hollow Sections Unit and Coil 
Coating Line) 
• identifying cost savings and 
added-value 
• captures ideas and commitment of 
workers to processes of cootinuous 
learning and improvement 
• quality employment 
• ski11s and career development 
• remuneration, employment condi- • contract negotiations (reps from • rewards shared 
tions company and union site committee) 
• performance development and review • special BIP team to develop social • employment security 
policy for redeployment and retraining 
• training/learning (reps from management, workers, • protection during restructuring 
unions) 
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1 Model assumes union structures and culture undergo similar processes of worlq>lace refonn 
2collective Employment Contract 
3 Business Improvement Programme 
4 Unit Communications Groups 
Examples drawn from case study on BHP NZ Steel, Chapter 9 in Reform at Work NZ Workplace change in the 
New Industrial Order, Longman-Paul, in press, Martin Peny, Carl Davidson and Roberta Hill. 
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for participation and responsibility in each of the decision 
making arenas. As BHP New Zealand Steel's experience 
shows, the involvement of site unions was fundamental to 
the achievement of effective change. Workers were in-
volved in the restructuring process, both directly in the 
workplace and indirectly through union representation 
through a consultation and participation agreement nego-
tiated by the combined site unions. This agreement com-
mitted BHP New Zealand Steel management and the site 
unions to reach consensus about all aspects of the restruc-
turing. Unions and management were expected to work 
together to gather information, investigate options for 
restructuring, develop a restructuring plan, and jointly 
communicate about the plan and its implementation with 
the workforce using the mechanism of the Unit Communi-
cations Groups (UGCs). One of the principles driving this 
agreement was a recognition that the smooth introduction 
of new production improvements, work methods, proc-
esses, equipment, technology and training could only be 
achieved by consultation and participation. 
The BIP process was seen to have achieved significant 
efficiency and financial benefits. Utilisation of the plant 
went up from 58 per cent in 1989 to 90 per cent in 1992, 
cost per tonne of raw steel fell from $450-500 to $340-360 
over the same peri~ and productivity increased from 200 
tonnes per year per employee to 420. Raw steel slab 
production increased from411 ,OOOtonnesa year to645,000 
tonnes by June 1994 (close to plant capacity of 700, 000 
tonnes), and a small profit had been achieved (Skellern, 
1994). 
By March 1994, BHP NZ Steel had identified more than 
$154 million per annum in savings and had implemented 
$60 million of these savings. Total sales volume had 
doubled, although revenue had remained constant over the 
same period because of significant pricing pressure in 
export and domestic markets. However, domestic market 
volumes had grown 20 per cent in the 1992/93 year, and a 
further 5 per cent in 1993/94, driven by a strengthening of 
the New Zealand economy. 
In the light of these positive improvements and expet ience 
from the implementation of the BIP strategy, the develop-
ment of the CEC and long-term strategic plans, in late 1993 
BHP New Zealand Steel embarked on a further strategic 
programme called the mutual development project (MDP). 
Peter Jenkins, the MDP leader, believed that the BIP 
process was ·the broad trigger which brought out the 
people issues' now being addressed through the :MDP 
project 
Our sophisticated 'real-time' computer systems mean 
that much more information is available. The business 
won't get the maximum advantage out of this Wile ss 
employees on the shop floor have the skills and authority 
to make decisions based on this information. This leads 
us naturally into increased training, developing employ-
ees with wider skills. And if production workers are 
making production decisions which have major busi-
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ness implications, they need to be in self-managing 
teams. 
A senior site delegate explained that MDP had grown out 
of the learning that occurred through the business im-
provement programme. The BIP process involved an 
attempt to build up trust within the company that there was 
a commitment to form autonomous wmt groups. How-
ever, in his view, 
when the BIP process went through, they looked only at 
how work is done. You can't legislate inside people's 
heads. You've got to get co-operation. If you don't get 
commitment people will just say 'this is not my job' 
implying '/'m not going to co-operate' . Mutual develop-
ment was borne out of BIP, which was not going any-
where in the area of work practices. 
The :MDP aims are •to ensure the ongoing viability of BHP 
New Zealand Steel and the well-being of its employees' by 
taking a decentralised but co-ordinated approach across 
the whole company. The aims are seen to be intrinsically 
linked so that each will be enhanced by the success of the 
project, which has been designed to 
*enable achievement of the company's long-term busi-
ness goals by people at all levels of the company 
* lead to increased job satisfaction, employment security 
and productivity. 
llle MDP project will set basic principles for a co-ordinated 
programme covering areas such as remuneration pack-
ages, career paths, training and portability of sldJJs, work 
organisation (moving more fully into self -managing teams), 
work allocation (addressing demarcation issues) and the 
use of contractors (NetWork News 1993). 
Conclusions 
Despite the turbulence created by the legacy of the Think 
Big project, deregulation and frequent ownership changes, 
BHP NZ Steel was able to develop a successful pro-
gramme of reform and restructuring in the workplace. 
Pressure from customers put pressure on the company, 
initially to achieve cost and price reductions and quality 
improvements, and subsequently to achieve significant 
improvements in delivery lead time and reliability. This 
required significant changes in workplace organisation, 
since customer demand for products on a shorter lead time 
required more frequent product cycle changes (including 
the size and chemistry of the product). As a consequence, 
frequent machine changes were required and this led to 
pressme to reduce set-up time. 
A key factor in the success of the workplace reorganisation 
and reform was the involvement of workers directly in the 
workplace and indirectly through union representation. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties that this has involved. the 
ability to discuss problems and issues through a formal 
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system of consultation and the BIP process allowed the 
company to make progress in developing programmes to 
improve productivity, product quality, customer service 
and the quality of working life. Significant progress, 
however, could only be made when joint management and 
union programmes were developed that facilitated genu-
ine participation and information sharing. 
The experience of an earlier survival plan, and, subse-
quently, the longer-term business improvement pro-
gramme, taught BHP New ZeaJand Steel management that 
a focus on cost savings and value added ideas was insuffi-
cient to produce the flexibility and innovativeness that is 
needed for the current business environment The next 
stage is to move, through the mutual development projec~ 
to a variety of innovative changes including self -managing 
work groups. 
Future research 
The paper has focused on structures and processes for join 
decision-making on workplace reform by mangement and 
labour. As many writers have argued, these are not 
homogeneous categories. Further research is needed to 
examine the ways in which relationships based on gender 
and race affect the development of these structures and 
processes duringperiods of workplace transformation. 
Research also needs to be directed towards assessing 
whether, and to what ex ten~ union cooperation with 
workplace reform initiatives results in eo-option. 
Finally, work:place reform research, such as the case study 
on which this paper is based, derives primarily from 
research on the manufacturing sector. Future research 
needs to examine the utility of f:he conceptual framework 
outlined in Table 1 of the paper for understanding quality 
initiatives in the service and information sectors. 
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